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ii THE IMPACT OF RATING CHANGES IN AUSTRALIAN 
FINANCIAL MARKETS 
Adam Creighton, Luke Gower and Anthony Richards 
1.  Introduction 
Credit rating agencies have become an integral part of the international financial 
system. The two largest agencies now operate in over 100 countries and assign 
over 150 000 ratings (White 2001). In Australia, they rate over 500 issuers, which 
account for nearly all of the outstanding stock of bonds. 
The main role of the agencies is to convey opinions to financial markets about the 
creditworthiness of debt instruments and issuers. To the extent that they are 
specialists in obtaining and processing information about default risk, the actions 
of rating agencies reduce lenders’ information-gathering costs and thereby 
facilitate the operation of securities markets. Ratings are also used by regulators in 
many countries. For example, in the United States rating agencies feature in 
securities markets regulation and, at a global level, the new Basel Capital Accord is 
likely to give agencies a role in determining banks’ regulatory capital.1 
Over the past few years, however, the performance of rating agencies has been 
widely debated. Rating agencies have been periodically criticised for inaccurate 
ratings and slow reactions to new information. This criticism has intensified since 
the collapse of Enron, WorldCom and HIH Insurance, which carried investment 
grade ratings just a few months before their failure. Such events have also 
prompted the interest of market regulators. The US Securities and Exchange 
Commission and the International Organization of Securities Commissions have 
both issued reports that examine the role of rating agencies in securities markets 
and discuss areas where rating agencies could be subject to greater regulation.2 
                                           
1  Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2003). 
2  See US Securities and Exchange Commission (2003) and International Organization of 
Securities Commissions (2003). 2 
The formal evidence on rating agency performance is mixed. At one level, 
agencies’ ratings appear on average to be accurate measures of relative default 
risk: for example, bonds issued with higher ratings have lower subsequent default 
rates than lower-rated bonds (Standard & Poor’s 2001). In addition, many studies 
find that security prices react predictably to rating changes, rising after upgrades 
and falling after downgrades. This implies that rating decisions do provide 
information for financial markets. But the size of the response is generally quite 
small and the vast majority of the adjustment in prices around ratings 
announcements actually appears to occur in the weeks or months prior to the 
announcement. On balance, this evidence suggests that the decisions of agencies 
convey little new information to the market. 
This paper reports the results of an event study using Australian data, where we 
examine the extent to which the prices of corporate debt and equity respond to the 
announcement of changes in ratings. Most earlier studies have used data for the US 
market, where there is a substantial role for credit ratings in laws and regulations. 
For example, the Investment Company Act of 1940 ensures money market funds 
invest only in securities rated in the two highest categories, and the investment 
grade distinction is important in the Federal Deposit Insurance Act, where 
corporate debt is only ‘investment grade’ if rated in one of the four highest 
categories. Given that the portfolio decisions of US investors are affected by the 
decisions of rating agencies, this raises the possibility that earlier results showing 
that US market prices respond to rating agency decisions may be partly the result 
of the regulatory framework. By contrast, there is a more limited regulatory role 
for credit ratings in the Australian regulatory framework, and the Australian 
Prudential Regulation Authority’s use of credit ratings is restricted to quite 
technical matters.3 Accordingly, the Australian financial market offers a fertile 
environment for research on the role of ratings where the impact of rating changes 
can be observed free from major regulatory effects. 
                                           
3  General insurers can use credit ratings to determine counterparty risk weightings (General 
Insurance Guidance Note 110.4); mortgage insurers must be rated at least ‘A’ for Authorised 
Deposit-taking Institutions (ADIs) to receive a concessional risk weighting for insured 
mortgages (ADI Guidance Note 112.1); and, ratings are one of the criteria for determining 
whether certificates of deposit and bank bills can be categorised as ‘high quality liquid assets’ 
(ADI Prudential Standard 210.0). 
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Overall, our results are quite encouraging in the sense that – unlike some earlier 
work – we find that upgrades and downgrades have immediate effects on both debt 
and equity prices, and that these responses are in the expected direction. However, 
the impacts are economically small, and there is strong evidence in the case of 
downgrades and equity returns that rating agencies ‘lag the market’ in the sense 
that their changes appear to reflect information which has already been factored 
into prices. We find some evidence – mainly in the bond market – that ratings 
downgrades have larger impacts on market prices than upgrades. Further, there is 
some evidence that rating changes have larger effects on equity prices when they 
relate to smaller firms, when they are relatively unexpected, and when they carry a 
firm from investment to sub-investment grade. 
The plan of the paper is as follows. Section 2 reviews some related literature. 
Sections 3 and 4 outline the method and data employed. Section 5 presents the 
results for the analysis of debt and equity prices around rating announcements, 
while Section 6 concludes with an overall discussion of the results. 
2.  Previous Literature 
The existing empirical literature on rating agencies addresses a number of 
questions. For example, there is evidence that ratings are highly correlated with 
subsequent default rates (see Standard and Poor’s (2001)), although there appears 
to be little evidence as to whether ratings are better predictors of default rates than 
other information or variables. There are also studies as to whether agencies’ 
ratings contain information that is different from the ratings of equity analysts (see 
Ederington and Goh (1998)). In the case of banks, there are studies about the 
relative information content of agencies’ ratings and supervisory ratings 
(e.g., Berger, Davies and Flannery (2000)). And, given the debate over the 
potential role of rating agencies in the new Basel Capital Accord and concern that 
tying capital requirements to credit ratings may be destabilising, recent studies 
have also examined whether ratings are procyclical (e.g., Cantor, Mahoney and 
Mann (2003); Amato and Furfine (2003)). Finally, there is a substantial literature 
looking at the market pricing of debt and equity around the time of announcements  
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of changes in ratings. This paper focuses on this last topic, using data from the 
Australian bond and equity markets. 
The early literature on the behaviour of debt and equity prices around rating 
announcements invariably used data from the US markets, although there are now 
also a number of studies using European data. Of those studies that look at bond 
returns or yields, a substantial number have failed to find significant effects from 
ratings, perhaps due to data problems (e.g., Gropp and Richards (2001)). 
Nonetheless, some studies have found evidence that bond prices or spreads do 
change in the expected direction around rating announcements (e.g., 
Hand, Holthausen and Leftwich (1992); Cantor and Packer (1996); Hite and 
Warga (1997); Kliger and Sarig (2000)). Although there is some variation in 
results across studies, there is evidence that downgrades are associated with larger 
market movements than upgrades, that lower-rated bonds respond more than 
higher-rated ones, and that the market movements around rating announcements 
are substantially smaller than the movements seen in the weeks or months prior to 
the announcements. 
Each of these findings accords with expectations. If firms have incentives to 
release positive information about their prospects but to downplay negative 
information, then markets will look to third-parties such as rating agencies for 
objective analysis, and downgrades will be more newsworthy. And given the 
historical mapping between ratings and default probabilities, whereby default 
probabilities increase more sharply towards the lower end of the rating spectrum, it 
is to be expected that market prices respond more to rating changes in the latter 
range. Finally, if markets are reasonably efficient and rating agencies have little 
access to non-public information and change their ratings relatively infrequently, 
then it is not surprising that much of the price adjustment around rating changes 
occurs prior to the announcement of the change. 
Due to data availability problems with bonds (which we discuss in Section 4), a 
larger number of studies of announcement effects have actually used equity returns 
rather than bond market data. The assumption implicit in most of these studies is 
that information that is good (bad) news for bondholders will also be good (bad) 
news for equityholders, so equity prices should respond in the same way as bond  
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prices, rising following upgrades and falling following downgrades. However, as is 
discussed by Goh and Ederington (1993), this assumption may not always be 
correct. In particular, it is possible to think of circumstances where a change in a 
bond rating may not reflect any view about the overall profitability of a company 
(where rating changes have similar implications for both bondholders and 
equityholders), but instead may reflect decisions that are being taken by 
management that benefit one class of claimants at the expense of the other. While 
such differential impacts on the different claimants are theoretically possible, it 
seems unlikely that such cases constitute a particularly large subset of all rating 
changes, and indeed most studies proceed on the assumption that if rating 
announcements are relevant for equity pricing, downgrades (upgrades) will be 
associated with negative (positive) returns. 
Indeed, the empirical literature suggests that equity prices generally respond in the 
‘expected’ direction around the time of rating changes (e.g., Holthausen and 
Leftwich (1986); Hand et al (1992); Schweitzer, Szewcyzk and Varma (1992); 
Goh and Ederington (1993); Billett, Garfinkel and O’Neal (1998)). However, while 
many studies find significantly negative returns around downgrades, some studies 
find that returns around upgrades are statistically insignificant. In addition, the 
magnitude of announcement effects is often quite small, especially when compared 
with the movements in stock prices that occur prior to the rating announcements. 
For example, Holthausen and Leftwich (1986) find cumulative average abnormal 
returns in the US equity market of around –20 per cent in the 300 trading days 
prior to downgrades, but an announcement effect of only about –1 per cent. 
To sum up, most previous evidence from foreign markets suggests that rating 
changes have relatively little impact on market prices of both bonds and equities 
and that rating decisions tend to lag earlier movements in market prices. The 
finding that announcement effects are relatively small suggests that market 
participants generally perceive that there is only limited new information in the 
decisions of agencies. Furthermore, the evidence that announcement effects are 
typically far smaller than pre-announcement market movements implies that much 
of the information that prompts rating changes is already reflected in market prices 
prior to the announcement of the change. Indeed, supporting evidence for this 
proposition can be found in the work of Ederington and Goh (1998) who show that 
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most bond downgrades are preceded by declines in actual corporate earnings and 
in stock analysts’ forecasts of earnings. 
The only earlier Australian evidence on the impact of rating announcements on 
financial market prices appears to be the study by Matolcsy and Lianto (1995) who 
examine the impact of changes in ratings of Australian Ratings (acquired by 
S&P in 1990) over 1982–1991. The study excludes rating changes if they are 
accompanied by corporate announcements such as mergers, but includes rating 
changes that coincide with earnings announcements. The analysis of weekly 
stock market returns around rating announcements shows that returns in either 
11-week or 25-week windows are significantly negative around downgrades and 
significantly positive around upgrades. However, after controlling for the 
information in earnings announcements in these windows, the authors suggest that 
returns are significantly different to zero only for ratings downgrades. 
This earlier study is complementary to ours in that there is almost no overlap in the 
sample periods of the two studies. However, our study makes three important 
innovations relative to the earlier one. In particular, it examines movements in 
bond yields as well as equity prices; it uses daily rather than weekly data and 
therefore focuses on the precise day of each announcement; and, due to the growth 
of the Australian corporate bond market, it has a substantially larger sample size 
(even after excluding all events that were accompanied by value-relevant 
announcements). 
3.  Methodology 
We examine the impact of the announcement of rating changes on debt and equity 
prices using relatively standard event study techniques.4 Given the depth of 
information available about companies from a variety of sources, our null   
hypothesis is that announcements by rating agencies should not be associated with 
impacts on market prices. We depart from a number of earlier studies by excluding 
rating changes that coincide with other major corporate news such as   
                                           
4  See MacKinlay (1997) for a general discussion of event studies. 
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announcements concerning earnings, mergers and divestments. The reason for 
excluding these events, which Hand et al (1992) refer to as ‘contaminated’ events, 
is to ensure that we are capturing the impact (if any) of rating changes per se on 
market prices and not simply the effect of other value-relevant news.5 In our case, 
this rules out more than half of all rating changes, and the announcement effects 
that we document in Section 5 would be substantially larger had we kept all the 
‘contaminated’ events in the sample. 
We define the date of the announcement (the ‘event’) as t = 0, and a window of  
20 days on either side of the event as the ‘event window’ (Figure 1). We attempt to 
isolate the movement of financial prices in the event window that is not due to 
factors influencing the overall market. In the case of equities, this is the ‘abnormal 
return’, and in the case of bonds, this is the change in spreads, which we define 
below. We assess the statistical significance of these abnormal movements based 
on the movements in financial prices in the ‘estimation window’, the 100-day 
period prior to the event window. 
Figure 1: Outline of Time-line for Event Study 
Estimation window Event window
100 days 20 days 20 days
t = –120 t = –20 t = 20 t = 0
 
In the case of equities, we estimate a standard market model using daily returns in 
the estimation window. For each event (i), the daily (log-differenced) equity price 
return for the relevant company (Rit) is regressed upon the corresponding broad 
market return (the All Ordinaries Index, Rmt) using ordinary least squares: 
  ˆ ˆ it i i mt it RR α βε = ++  (1) 
                                           
5  Of course, reports about major companies occur quite frequently. In cases where there were 
simultaneous news reports unrelated to the rating announcement, we omitted events if this 
other news appeared substantially more important than the rating announcement. 
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Abnormal returns for the event windows (ARit) are then defined as the difference 
between actual returns and the returns predicted by the market model using the 
parameters from the estimation window:6 
  ˆ ˆ ( it it i i mt) ARR R αβ =−+  (2) 
The daily average abnormal return (AARt) for any n events (either upgrades or 
downgrades) is then calculated by summing (in event-time) across the n events. 
The cumulative average abnormal return (CAAR( , )) between any two days   
and   within the event window is defined as the sum of the average abnormal 
returns over that period. The statistical significance of average abnormal returns in 
the event window can be assessed using the estimate of the standard deviation of 
average abnormal returns in the estimation window which is denoted s(AARt). 
Under the assumption of i.i.d. normally distributed abnormal returns, the ratio of 
AARt to s(AARt) is distributed as a Student’s t with n degrees of freedom. In 
addition, under these assumptions the standard deviation of any cumulative 
average abnormal return is given by s(AARt), multiplied by the square root of the 





In the case of debt securities, we analyse the impact on bond yields, or more 
specifically the impact on bond spreads, relative to the Commonwealth 
Government bond of comparable maturity. The movement in each bond’s yield 
spread (measured in basis points, or hundredths of one percentage point) provides a 
ready-made proxy for its abnormal performance relative to the overall market.7 
                                           
6  An alternative approach would be to recognise – based on earlier US studies cited in Section 2 
(and our data) – that decisions to change ratings may not be completely exogenous with 
respect to recent return outcomes. In particular, estimates of αi in the estimation window are 
unlikely to be reliable – downgrades are likely to be associated with negative estimates of αi 
and upgrades with positive estimates. On the other hand, estimates of βi should not be 
problematic. This would suggest estimating the market model including a constant term in the 
estimation window, but then defining the abnormal return in the event window to be given by 
Rit – βiRmt; i.e., removing the impact of the problematic constant term in the abnormal return. 
The result of this change is to make the pre-announcement and announcement effects in 
Figure 4 and Table 2 somewhat larger, but overall the results are little changed. 
7  Because corporate spreads tend to vary over time (i.e., corporate yields do not always move 
one-for-one with government yields), in principle one could measure spreads relative to other 
similarly rated bonds. However, this is difficult given the relatively small number of bonds 
within any single rating and maturity category in existing Australian indices. 
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The reason for considering spreads rather than bond returns is that the bonds in our 
sample have a range of maturities, so we would expect that a given impact on 
required bond yields or spreads would have different effects on the prices of 
different bonds, depending on the maturity of the bond. Hence, it may make little 
sense to examine abnormal returns of bond prices. 
For our statistical tests, we calculate the average basis point changes for each day 
of the event and estimation windows, for upgrades and downgrades separately. 
These average changes can be summed over time to compute cumulative average 
basis point changes. The statistical significance of the average and cumulative 
spread changes in the event window can then be determined by comparing them to 
the standard deviation of spread changes in the estimation window. The 
expectation is that if announcements of upgrades (downgrades) convey information 
to market participants, spreads on average will fall (rise) immediately following 
news of the rating change. 
In addition to the statistical tests for average abnormal returns or average spread 
changes, we also present tests based on the proportion of positive or negative 
changes in market prices. This type of test may be useful if abnormal returns or 
spread changes are not normally distributed. For this test, we compare the actual 
proportion of events that are positive and compare this with the theoretical 
distribution (a binomial test) under the null hypothesis that this proportion is equal 
to 0.5. Here the expectation is that if rating announcements convey information, 
the proportion of abnormal returns that are positive will be greater than (less than) 
0.5 following upgrades (downgrades), and the proportion of spread changes that 
are positive will be less than (greater than) 0.5 for upgrades (downgrades). 
4.  Data 
We analyse the impact of credit rating changes on Australian issuers by Moody’s 
and Standard and Poor’s, the two largest agencies in the Australian market.8 The 
                                           
8  All data on ratings are taken from Bloomberg. In the case of bonds we look at the specific 
rating that applies to the particular bond for which we have data. In the case of equities, we 
look at a general issuer rating, either the long-term local currency rating for S&P, or the issuer 
rating or senior unsubordinated debt rating for Moody’s.  
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sample covers changes in credit ratings between January 1990 and July 2003, with 
the sample limited to those ratings announcements that were not accompanied by 
other value-relevant announcements.9 These ratings are all ‘solicited’, being 
requested by the issuer, rather than being assigned by the agencies based only on 
public information. We treat simultaneous rating changes by both agencies as one 
event.10 To increase the size of our sample, our ratings events include both 
announcements of actual changes in ratings and announcements that an agency is 
actively considering a near-term rating change.11 We refer to the latter as ‘watch’ 
events, and treat them as either upgrades or downgrades based on the direction of 
the likely change indicated by the agency.12 We refer to actual changes as either 
‘anticipated’ if they are preceded by a watch, and ‘unanticipated’ if the rating was 
changed with no prior warning. 
The sample of events for our analysis of bond spreads is substantially constrained 
by data problems. One problem is that many listed companies do not issue bonds. 
More importantly, since corporate bonds are traded much less actively than 
equities and are not traded in a centralised exchange, it is difficult to get good daily 
data for bond prices and spreads. Indeed, the investment banks that calculate 
corporate bond indices are essentially the only source for daily bond data, and 
these banks tend to focus only on a subset of bonds which meet certain criteria 
regarding size and liquidity. Accordingly, for the event study using bond yields, 
our sample of rating changes is limited to those companies for which we could 
obtain daily data for at least one bond from either UBS Australia or Merrill Lynch, 
two providers of corporate bond indices. In principle, it would have been possible 
to get price data for a wider sample of bonds from Bloomberg, but many of these 
                                           
9  We use Bloomberg to check for other news about companies, which includes announcements 
concerning earnings, mergers and divestments. 
10 Cases of multiple announcements that occur within 10 days of each other are treated as only a 
single event. 
11 In cases where companies are removed from credit watch without a subsequent rating change, 
the removal of the watch was not considered an event in our sample. These cases are 
relatively rare and we were more uncomfortable about classifying them as being equivalent to 
the other upgrades or downgrades. 
12 Information from the rating agencies suggests that ‘watch’ announcements are followed more 
than two-thirds of the time by actual rating changes within a few months. Accordingly, they 
are a much stronger expression of an agency’s views than an ‘outlook’ which is simply an 
indication of the possible direction of movement in the rating over a much longer horizon. 
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prices appear to be matrix-based, rather than actual indicative price quotes as are 
used in the bond indices. 
Our sample of events for which we have both rating changes and yield spread data 
includes 33 announcements consisting of 21 downgrades and 12 upgrades. The 
bonds in question are all issued in Australia and denominated in Australian dollars. 
Most have maturities between two and three years, and spreads are calculated 
relative to a Commonwealth Government security of similar maturity. Our 
upgraded bonds have a median initial rating of A-/A3, and the day before the rating 
announcement have a median spread of 67 basis points. Downgraded bonds have a 
slightly higher median initial rating of A/A2, but a higher median initial spread of 
87 basis points. 
In the case of equities, the number of events is much larger because shares are 
more actively traded and price information is readily available.13 The sample 
includes 141 rating announcements for which we have accompanying equity 
returns and which are not ruled out because they occur at the same time as a 
corporate announcement. Of these 141 events, 33 are rating watches and 108 are 
announcements of actual rating changes, 23 of which are more than one ‘notch’ in 
magnitude.14 Of the 108 rating changes, 48 were preceded by a watch and so are 
‘anticipated’ according to our definition, and the other 93 events (including 
watches) are therefore ‘unanticipated’.15 Downgrades (including negative watches) 
account for 95 of the events and upgrades (including positive watches) account for 
46 events. The 141 events involve 62 different firms from 15 industry groups, and 
their industry concentration is broadly representative of the composition of the All 
Ordinaries Index. Reflecting the recent growth in the corporate bond market and 
the wider use of bond ratings, our sample is dominated by more recent events, and 
the second half of the sample period contains about three-quarters of all the events. 
Finally, rating changes by S&P account for 100 of the equity events, broadly 
                                           
13 Equity returns are based on the indices for total returns (prices plus dividends) constructed by 
Thomson Financial. 
14 Broad ratings categories are typically divided into three subcategories or ‘notches’ (the 
exception is AAA/Aaa).  
15 The reason why we have fewer (33) rating watches than rating changes that were preceded by 
a watch (48) is that many announcements that the rating is on watch occur at the same time as 
other corporate announcements and are excluded for that reason. 
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reflecting that agency’s greater presence in the Australian market. Appendix A 
gives more detail for both bond and equity events. 
5.  Results 
Given that ratings relate specifically to bonds rather than equities, we present the 
results for bond yields first. In each case, we present results for average abnormal 
returns on the announcement day and for the two days prior to and following 
announcements. In addition, we present cumulative average spread changes or 
abnormal returns for three windows: pre-announcement (day –20 to –1); 
announcement (day 0 and 1, allowing for some lagged response of prices); and 
post-announcement (day 2 to 20). Most of the discussion of our results focuses on 
the market movements over these three broader windows. 
5.1  Bonds 
While the small sample of events must remain a caveat, the overall picture from 
the event study for bond yields is that there is essentially no movement in yield 
spreads prior to ratings announcements, and then a small but statistically 
significant change immediately following the announcements (Figure 2 and 
Table 1). Looking first at the estimation window (days –120 to –21), the data for 
cumulative average spread changes in the estimation window suggest that bonds 
subject to upgrades and downgrades both exhibit some very modest tendency to 
narrow in the period leading up to the announcement. At first glance, this common 
narrowing of spreads – although it is not statistically significant – appears 
puzzling, but it appears to be due to the natural tendency for credit spreads to 
narrow gradually as maturities shorten. In particular, the analysis in Appendix B 
suggests that for bonds of around 2 to 3 years outstanding maturity, the passage of 
100 days should normally be associated with a narrowing in spreads of around 
4 basis points (bps), which is approximately what is observed in Figure 2. 
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Looking next to the event window, the cumulative spread change in the pre-
announcement (days –20 to –1) and post-announcement (days 2 to 20) windows 
are statistically insignificant. There is, however, a statistically significant 
movement in spreads on the day of both downgrades and upgrades. The cumulative 
average changes on the day of the announcement and the day following the 
announcement (days 0 and 1) are a fall in spreads of 3.4 bps for upgrades and a rise 
of 10.3 bps for downgrades. In addition, around 80 per cent of the events show 
changes in spreads of the expected sign during this two-day window, with the 
observed proportions for downgrades being statistically significantly different from 
0.5. 

















-120 -80 -60 -100 -40 -20 0 20
 
Note:  The cumulative two-day changes to day 1 are shown in bold. 
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Table 1: Changes in Bond Spreads around Rating Announcements  
Average spread change – bps  Proportion of negative changes Days relative 
to event  Upgrades Downgrades  Upgrades Downgrades 
–2 0.6  –0.1  0.25  0.67 
–1 –1.0  0.0  0.58  0.57 
0 –2.6***  3.7***  0.75  0.19*** 
1 –0.7  6.5***  0.42  0.38 
2 –0.3  0.1  0.42  0.62 
  Cumulative average 
spread change – bps 
Proportion of 
negative changes 
 Upgrades  Downgrades  Upgrades  Downgrades 
–20 to –1  –1.0  1.1  0.42  0.57 
0 to 1  –3.4***  10.3***  0.75  0.19*** 
2 to 20  0.4  –0.2  0.50  0.48 
        
Sample size  12  21     
Standard deviation of 
daily spread change – bps 
0.6 0.5     
Note:  ***, **, * indicate significance at the 1, 5 and 10 per cent level; two-tailed t-test. 
 
Given the average levels of spreads prior to announcements (66 bps for upgrades 
and 90 bps for downgrades), these changes around the immediate announcement 
period correspond to percentage changes in spreads of around 5 per cent for 
upgrades and 11 per cent for downgrades. It is noteworthy that the impact for 
downgrades is both larger and more protracted, with a widening of about 4 bps on 
the day of the announcement and a further 6 bps the following day. The size and 
pattern of this impact partly reflects the effect of one particularly influential 
observation, the downgrade of Southcorp from BBB to BB+, a non-investment 
grade. The measured spread of this bond widens by 90 bps on the day after the 
downgrade announcement and contributes about 4 bps to the average spread 
change on day 1.16 While this delayed adjustment is puzzling, the average spread 
change on day 1 remains significant even when this bond is excluded. It is unclear 
whether this delayed adjustment indicates that markets do not absorb new 
                                           
16 The median two-day spread change of 8.4 bps is only modestly smaller than the average 
change of 10.3 bps, so our results do not appear to be excessively affected by any particular 
outlier. 
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information immediately, that some rating changes were made late in the trading 
day, or simply that it is difficult to obtain accurate daily data on bond spreads. 
Comparing our results with earlier studies, it is perhaps noteworthy that we find 
little evidence of bond spreads moving in advance of the changes by rating 
agencies, as would be expected if the decisions of agencies are based at least partly 
on information that is already in the public domain and reflected in pricing. Data 
problems due to the illiquidity of the market would be one possibility, but this 
seems unlikely given that we do see a significant change in bond spreads in the 
immediate announcement window. Indeed, based on the analysis in Appendix B, it 
would seem that the estimate of the average change in spreads on days 0 and 1 
represents around half of the total adjustment in spreads that would be expected. In 
particular, the median rating change in our sample is between A and A-, and the 
analysis in Appendix B would suggest that this difference in ratings is typically 
associated with an ‘equilibrium’ spread differential of around 9 bps. Given that the 
median two-day change in spreads in our analysis is around 4.5 bps, it seems that 
half of the total adjustment we would expect to see in yields is occurring in the 
immediate period around ratings announcements. 
The analysis in Appendix B also gives an indication of the magnitude of change in 
bond prices that might be expected to result from a one-notch rating change. For 
the median bond in our sample, a 9 bps change in yields (assuming, for illustrative 
purposes, a coupon and yield of 7 per cent and maturity of 2½ years) will result in 
a price change of only about 0.21 per cent. Given the relatively small size of this 
implied change and the various data problems in the bond market, it is perhaps not 
surprising that other event studies have frequently failed to find significant impacts 
on bond prices or returns. 
5.2  Equities 
The behaviour of equity returns around rating announcements is quite different to 
the behaviour observed in bond markets. The greatest contrast is in terms of the 
significant market movements that take place over a long period prior to rating 
announcements. This is illustrated most starkly in Figure 3, which shows that 
companies subject to downgrades on average have underperformed the broader  
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market by around 12 per cent in the estimation window (days –120 to –21).17 By 
contrast, there is little evidence of outperformance by companies that are 
subsequently upgraded by rating agencies. 
Figure 3: Cumulative Market–adjusted Equity Returns 
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Note:  Market-adjusted returns are defined as the raw equity price return minus the market index return. 
For downgrades, we find continuing evidence of underperformance by companies 
in the pre-announcement period of the event window (days –20 to –1). The 
cumulative average abnormal return for companies that are subsequently 
downgraded is around –6 per cent; and 64 per cent of the events are associated 
with negative returns, which is statistically significantly different from 50 per cent 
(Figure 4 and Table 2). By contrast, there is only very weak evidence of positive 
abnormal returns in this period for companies that are subsequently upgraded. In 
                                           
17 It is, however, noteworthy that the downgrades in our sample have historically not occurred in 
times of falling equity markets. The data suggest that downgrades occur independently of 
movements in the broader markets, so that rating agencies have responded to idiosyncratic 
weakness of issuers, rather than weakness in conditions for the broader corporate sector. 
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particular, the cumulative average abnormal return of 1 per cent in this period is 
not significant, nor is the proportion of events with positive returns. 
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Note:  The cumulative two-day average abnormal returns to day 1 are shown in bold. 
Around the announcement, we find that downgrades are associated with negative 
returns both on the day of the announcement and the day after the announcement, 
with cumulative average abnormal returns over this period (days 0 to 1) of   
–1.3 per cent. However, this underperformance is small compared with the 
underperformance that is seen over the previous 20 days, and indeed the 100 days 
prior to the event window. Thus, it appears that the information that prompts rating 
agencies to lower ratings (or place ratings on negative watch) is largely already 
reflected in equity prices, and that the decisions of the agencies convey little 
additional information to the market. In addition, there is no evidence of any 
protracted market reaction to rating changes, since the cumulative average 
abnormal return for days 2 to 20 is insignificant. 
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Table 2: Abnormal Equity Returns around Rating Announcements  
Average abnormal return – per cent Proportion of negative returns Days relative 
to event  Upgrades Downgrades Upgrades  Downgrades 
–2 0.8  –0.5*  0.52  0.56 
–1 0.0  0.0  0.5  0.52 
0 1.2**  –0.8***  0.26***  0.55 
1 –0.1  –0.6**  0.57  0.58 
2 –0.2  0.2  0.59  0.55 
  Cumulative average 
abnormal return – per cent 
Proportion of 
negative returns 
 Upgrades  Downgrades  Upgrades  Downgrades 
–20 to –1  1.1  –5.8***  0.41  0.64*** 
0 to 1  1.1  –1.3***  0.30**  0.56 
2 to 20  0.2  –1.0  0.56  0.53 
        
Sample size  46  95     
Standard deviation of 
daily abnormal return 
– per cent 
0.5 0.3     
Note:  ***, **, * indicate significance at the 1, 5 and 10 per cent level; two-tailed t-test. 
 
Turning to upgrades, we find some evidence that companies that are upgraded by 
rating agencies outperform the general market on the day of the announcement. 
The average abnormal return of 1.2 per cent on the event day is statistically 
significant, and the proportion of events showing positive abnormal returns is 
74 per cent which is also statistically significant. There is no evidence for ongoing 
adjustment in market prices in either the average abnormal returns for day 1 or for 
days 2 to 20. Overall, the cumulative abnormal return in the entire event window 
(days –20 to +20) is around only 2 per cent for upgrades, versus around –8 per cent 
for downgrades. 
Our results for the immediate market impact of upgrades and downgrades are 
slightly at odds with earlier research. In particular, earlier studies have mostly 
suggested that the impact of downgrades tends to be larger than the impact 
of upgrades. Notwithstanding firms’ obligations to provide market-relevant 
information in a timely manner, one explanation for this earlier finding would be 
that firms have an incentive to release positive information as soon as possible, and 
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to hide negative information, which would make downgrades more newsworthy. 
Our point estimates for the two-day announcement window (days 0 and 1) suggest 
little difference between the magnitude of the effects for upgrades and downgrades 
(1.1 per cent and –1.3 per cent, respectively).18 However, the two-day effect for 
upgrades is not strictly statistically significant, so perhaps the contrast with earlier 
work is not that large. It is also noteworthy that the results for bonds are consistent 
with the notion that downgrades have larger immediate impacts than upgrades. 
While our results provide evidence that both bond and equity prices respond to 
ratings announcements, the statistical significance of the results is stronger for 
bond yields than for equity prices. This might reflect the fact that ratings refer 
specifically to probability of default on a company’s bonds, and are not necessarily 
broader indicators of a company’s health. Indeed, as was discussed in Section 2, 
the response of equity prices to changes in bond ratings is theoretically ambiguous. 
In theory, some rating changes may reflect an agency’s view that a firm’s 
management is acting in a way that benefits one class of claimants at the expense 
of the other. Hence, an upgrade (downgrade) to the firm’s bond rating might be 
bad (good) news for equityholders. The results presented so far provide no 
evidence for the presence of such cases: on average, upgrades (downgrades) are 
associated with positive (negative) price effects for equities. 
However, in principle it is possible that there might at least be some proportion of 
events where the rating announcement prompts some perverse response in equity 
prices. If so, the distribution of abnormal returns for upgrades or downgrades on 
the announcement day would consist of a mixture of two different distributions, 
one with a positive mean and the other with a negative mean. We can test for this 
by examining the cross-sectional standard deviation of announcement-day 
abnormal returns to see if this is substantially larger than the equivalent standard 
deviation in the estimation window. When we do so, we find that the standard 
deviation of abnormal returns on upgrade days is 1.8 per cent, which is actually 
less than the estimation-window average of 2.8 per cent. The standard deviation for 
downgrades of 2.9 per cent is higher than the estimation-window average of 
                                           
18 However, an explanation for the lack of evidence in our results for larger impacts from 
downgrades may be that, in our sample, downgrades are more likely to be anticipated than are 
upgrades: 41 per cent of downgrades are preceded by a watch, compared with only 
20 per cent of upgrades. As we show in Section 5.3, the response of equity prices to rating 
changes is apparently smaller when the changes are (at least partly) anticipated.  
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2.6 per cent, but it is far from being statistically significantly different. Hence, 
these results provide no support for the existence of a subset of events for which 
equity prices respond perversely to the announcement of bond rating changes. 
5.3  Firm Size and Type of Rating Change 
In addition to differences in the response to upgrades and downgrades, it is 
possible that the effects of rating changes may vary in other ways across types of 
rating changes or firms. To explore this possibility, we split the sample in three 
ways to test hypotheses relating to different response patterns. Since the sample of 
bond events and equity upgrades is quite small, we limit this analysis to equity 
downgrades. 
The first possibility is that the impact of a ratings announcement may depend on 
whether or not the rating change is ‘anticipated’. More specifically, does the fact 
that a firm has earlier been placed on a rating watch reduce the market impact of 
the announcement of a subsequent downgrade, relative to the market impact of a 
watch announcement or a rating change that was not preceded by a watch? For this 
test, our data suggest that we can reject the hypothesis that the market impact of 
the two types of events is similar. In particular, the data suggest that only 
unanticipated downgrades have an impact in the immediate event window 
(Table 3). For the two-day announcement window (days 0 and 1), the impact of 
unanticipated events is –1.8 per cent versus an insignificant –0.7 per cent for 
anticipated events. 
The second hypothesis is that the reaction of a security’s price to a rating change 
might depend on the size of the particular firm. A difference might arise if large 
firms are subject to more market scrutiny, so that the opinions of the rating 
agencies would be less influential and have a smaller impact on prices. To test this, 
we divide the 62 firms into 2 equal-sized groups according to their relative market 
capitalisations. We find some evidence for differential market impact based on 
firm size. Announcement window returns are significantly negative for smaller 
firms but insignificant for larger firms (–2.0 per cent versus –0.6 per cent). In 
addition, there is also a large difference in abnormal returns in the 20-day period 
leading up to the rating announcement, when smaller firms have much larger 
 21 
cumulative abnormal returns (–8.8 per cent versus –1.4 per cent). It is unclear what 
the explanation for the latter difference might be. 
Table 3: Firm Size and Type of Rating Change 


















Average abnormal returns – per cent 
–2 –0.2  –0.9**  –0.6  –0.3  –1.3  –0.4 
–1 0.2  –0.3  0.4  –0.4  2.0  –0.2 
0 –1.0**  –0.4  –1.1**  –0.2  –0.9  –0.7** 
1 –0.8**  –0.3  –0.8*  –0.3  –2.2*  –0.5 
2 0.5  –0.2  0.5  –0.2  2.0  0.1 
Cumulative average abnormal returns – per cent 
–20 to –1  –5.3***  –5.9***  –8.8*** –1.4  –15.1**  –4.9*** 
0 to 1  –1.8***  –0.7  –2.0*** –0.6  –3.2*  –1.2** 
2 to 20  –1.0  –0.9  –0.9  –1.2  –1.0  –0.9 
            
Sample size  56  39  53  42  7  88 
Standard 
deviation of daily 
abnormal return 
0.4 0.4  0.5  0.3  1.1  0.3 
Note:  ***, **, * indicate significance at the 1, 5 and 10 per cent level; two-tailed t-test. 
 
The third hypothesis is that rating changes might matter more when they carry an 
issuer from investment to speculative (or junk) grade. This is because some 
portfolio managers face restrictions on the type of credits that they can hold, and 
because movements below the investment grade threshold could have important 
psychological effects. However, the non-linear relationship between credit ratings 
and default probabilities might also explain why rating changes toward the lower 
end of the ratings spectrum, such as a downgrade into speculative grade, would be 
associated with larger price movements. The small number of rating changes 
(only 7) is a constraint in drawing strong conclusions in this regard, but there is 
some evidence that rating changes from investment to sub-investment grades do 
have larger market impacts than other rating changes (–3.2 per cent versus 
–1.2 per cent). This would be consistent with the notion that markets do pay more 
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attention to rating changes that lower credit ratings to sub-investment grade levels. 
There is also evidence that rating changes to sub-investment grades are preceded 
by substantially larger abnormal returns in the 20-day period prior to 
announcements (–15.1 per cent versus –4.9 per cent). This may reflect the 
particular 7 cases in our sample, or it may reflect a broader wariness on the part of 
agencies to downgrade companies through this important barrier, so that such 
downgrades only occur after a very substantial amount of adverse news about the 
firms in question.19 
6.  Conclusion 
The results of our study provide reasonably clear evidence that announcements of 
rating changes (or that ratings are ‘on watch’ or ‘under review’ for change) do 
appear to be ‘news’, in that they affect prices in the Australian bond and equity 
markets. Bond spreads appear to widen in response to ratings downgrades and 
contract with upgrades. Equity prices tend to fall on days of downgrades and rise 
on days of upgrades. This finding is significant in light of the relatively limited role 
– in contrast to some other countries – that ratings play in the Australian regulatory 
framework. It is also noteworthy that we find significant effects for both upgrades 
and downgrades, and both bonds and equities. Many previous foreign studies have 
failed to find such consistent evidence for market impacts. We attribute our 
identification of such effects to the reasonable sample size that we have in the case 
of equity events, and in the case of bonds, to the quality of our data and our focus 
on spreads rather than prices. 
However, our estimates of the price impacts associated with rating announcements 
are arguably fairly small, so they suggest that agencies are not generally viewed as 
consistently having access to important information that is not already in the public 
domain. Instead, the modest size of the price impacts perhaps suggests that markets 
at most perceive agencies as simply obtaining and processing information in a way 
that at the margin provides a summary measure of creditworthiness. 
                                           
19 Johnson (2003) suggests that agencies may be aware of the importance of the investment 
grade barrier, and are mindful of the significance of downgrades through this barrier, so that 
the BBB-/Baa3 rating may in effect be ‘wider’ than other surrounding ratings. 
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Of course, looking ahead to a regime where ratings might have some role in 
regulatory bank capital requirements, it is possible that the decisions of agencies 
could affect market valuations because they impact directly on the cost of funds. In 
addition, if ratings become more widely used in debt contracts – for example, 
through ratings triggers which call for higher interest rates, provisions of more 
collateral, or even the repayment of the debt – then we might expect to see 
decisions of agencies have a greater impact on market prices. However, recent 
evidence suggests that in 2002 only around 15 per cent of large Australian firms 
had ratings triggers built into some of their borrowing agreements and also had 
ratings near enough to these triggers to warrant concern that they could be subject 
to potentially destabilising rating downgrades (see Standard & Poor’s (2002)). 
Hence, we suspect our results are not significantly influenced by the use of such 
provisions. 
In the case of equity returns and downgrades, we find very strong evidence that 
rating changes tend to follow long periods of underperformance. On average, 
companies that are downgraded have underperformed the market by around 
20 per cent in the preceding period. This suggests that downgrades are typically 
based on information that is well-and-truly in the public domain, which would be 
consistent with the finding of Ederington and Goh (1998) that most bond 
downgrades in the United States are preceded by declines in actual corporate 
earnings and in stock analysts’ forecasts of earnings.20 This would help to explain 
why the announcement-window impacts of rating changes were quite small. Yet, 
like most other work on rating agencies and market prices, our study yields a few 
conflicting findings, and it is puzzling that we find no evidence of noticeable pre-
announcement movements in prices in the bond market or before upgrades in the 
equity market. These results may partly reflect the smaller sample of events in 
these cases. However, the finding is also suggestive of some form of segmentation 
between the markets for corporate bonds and equities, whereby bond investors fail 
to respond to information that is already reflected in the more liquid equity 
markets. If there has indeed been such segmentation in the past, we suspect it will 
be less prevalent in the future given the growing use of market-based credit risk 
                                           
20 However, it should be noted that Ederington and Goh (1998) find that analysts do revise 
their earnings forecasts downwards after downgrades (with only small revisions following 
upgrades), which is consistent with the market viewing agencies’ announcements as 
conveying some information. 
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models, which link bond valuations directly to equity price movements (see 
Lowe (2002)). 
More broadly, it might be asked how our results relate to the debate over the role 
of rating agencies in the financial system. Critics of the agencies often point to the 
belated reactions of agencies in cases such as Enron. In addition, they point to the 
lack of market impact as evidence that agencies do not provide new information to 
the market. In contrast, rating agencies would argue that their ratings are opinions 
of long-term creditworthiness, and their aim of providing ratings that ‘look through 
the cycle’ would suggest that they should not respond to all short-term price 
movements: indeed, this reluctance to change ratings may also contribute to the 
stability of the financial system. Accordingly, if a firm’s prospects have altered to 
such an extent that a rating change is warranted, it would not be surprising if 
markets had already adjusted substantially. This points to the tensions that exist 
between the conflicting interests of different end-users, and the relative importance 
they place on timeliness and stability of ratings. 
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Appendix A: Further Description of Events 
Both bond and equity events can be classified according to their type and 
their source (Tables A1 and A2). The bond events apply to 19 different firms 
compared to 62 firms for equity events. Of the latter group, the raw materials, 
banking, food, and insurance sectors account for the largest proportion of firms, 
providing 14, 12, 5 and 5 firms respectively. The telecommunications, energy, real 
estate, and media sectors provide 4 firms each. 
Table A1: Bond Events 
  Downgrades Upgrades  Total 
 Unanticipated  Anticipated Watch  Unanticipated Anticipated  Watch   
Moody’s 1    3  1  3  1  3  12 
S&P 3  10  3  1 2  2  21 
Total 4  13  4 4 3  5  33 
 
Table A2: Equity Events
  Downgrades Upgrades  Total 
 Unanticipated  Anticipated Watch  Unanticipated Anticipated  Watch  
Moody’s 12    9    4    9  3    4    41 
S&P 24  30  16  15 6    9  100 
Total 36  39  20  24 9  13  141 
 
The average and median initial and final ratings for both bonds and equities 
demonstrate that, apart from their sample size, the distributions of ratings in the 
two groups of events are quite similar (Table A3). 
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Table A3: Average (Median) Initial and Final Ratings 
  Bond events  Equity events 
 Upgrades  Downgrades  Upgrades  Downgrades 
Initial A-/A3  A-/A3  BBB/Baa2  BBB+/Baa1 
 (A-/A3)  (A/A2)  (BBB+/Baa1)  (A-/A3) 
Final A/A2  BBB+/Baa1  BBB+/Baa1  BBB/Baa2 
 (A/A2)  (A-/A3)  (A-/A3)  (BBB+/Baa1) 
Note:  Medians (in parentheses) and averages have been rounded to the nearest rating notch; watches are
counted as half a notch. 
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Appendix B: A Cross-sectional Analysis of Bond Spreads 
The results presented in Section 5 estimate the short-run impact of rating changes 
on bond spreads. To compare these results with the expected long-run 
‘equilibrium’ impact on spreads, we estimate a simple cross-sectional relationship 
between spreads, credit ratings, and modified duration in the Australian corporate 
bond market. Our sample comprises the 466 bonds that appeared in the 
Merrill Lynch Australian corporate bond index at the end of each of the years from 
1999 to 2003, with the deletion of a small number of obvious outliers. Because we 
are using data for different years, we also include year dummies to account for the 
variation in average spreads over time. The results appear in Table B1. 
Table B1: The Cross-sectional Relationship between Spreads, 
Ratings and Duration 
Independent variables  Coefficient  t-statistic P-value 
Constant 16.8  4.2  0.00 
Rating 1.6  1.4  0.17 
Rating squared  0.7  4.2  0.00 
Duration 18.3  10.9  0.00 
Duration squared  –1.2  –6.6  0.00 
Dummy 2002  –1.0  –0.4  0.70 
Dummy 2001  –2.9  –1.2  0.20 
Dummy 2000  8.6  3.3  0.00 
Dummy 1999  7.4  2.7  0.01 
 
For simplicity, the spread in basis points is used as the dependent variable, but the 
results are similar for more complex (and arguably more appropriate) 
transformations of the spread. Alphabetic ratings are converted to a cardinal scale 
from 0 (AAA/Aaa) to 9 (BBB-/Baa3). The OLS regression includes dummy 
variables to control for differences between spreads in particular years, and also 
squared terms to account for non-linear relationships among spreads and the main 
independent variables. The equation has an adjusted R
2 of 0.52. 
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The ratings coefficients (in particular the squared term) imply that bonds with 
poorer ratings have higher spreads, and the coefficients for duration show that 
spreads narrow as bonds near their maturity. The median rating change in our 
sample of bonds from Section 3 is between A and A-, which translates into a 9 bps 
change using the analysis above. Additionally, the passage of 100 days (or about 
0.3 years of duration), as occurs during our estimation window, is associated with a 
fall in spreads of around 4 bps. 
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